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Abstract
How can we acquire knowledge of metaphysical modality? How can someone come
to know that he could have been elsewhere right now, or an accountant rather than a
philosophy teacher, but could not have been a turnip? Jago proposes an account of a
route to knowledge of the way things could have been and must be. He argues that
we can move to knowledge of metaphysical modality from knowledge about
essence. Curtis rejects Jago’s explanation. It cannot, he argues, explain our
knowledge of de re necessity. We agree. But there is more to be said. To give an
account of our knowledge of metaphysical necessity is part of the task Jago set
himself. But another part is to give an account of the knowledge of the (non-actual)
possibilities accorded to particular objects. And prior to both what is needed, and
something Jago attempts to supply, is an account of how ordinary knowers can come
to have knowledge of an individual’s essential properties. We argue that Jago’s
accounts of both these additional matters are also unsatisfactory. This is important
because the thought that our knowledge of metaphysical modality has its source in
our knowledge of essence is currently an attractive one and Jago has set out very
clearly what must be done to justify the thought. The flaws in his proposal thus
indicate the work needed if the attractive thought is to be accepted.
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1 Introduction
The Aristotelian concept of essence, of ‘what it is to be’, and the link, if any,
between that concept and the modal concepts of necessity and possibility were core
topics of metaphysical discussion in the centuries that followed its introduction.
Aristotle himself favoured a so-called ‘definitional’ account of essence according to
which the concept of essence can be specified independently of de re modal notions,
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although he saw a link between modal concepts and concepts closely related to that
of essence, in the Topics defining the notion of an accidental property, for example,
in terms of a property that might or might not belong to an object (cf. Fine 1994: 2)).
The issue of the link between essence and modality persisted beyond antiquity and
was discussed at length by Avicenna and the scholastic philosophers in the middle
ages (e.g. Boethius, Aquinas, Ockham) where the question of whether essence can
be separated from existence took center stage, with modal notions (and in particular
the distinction between what is actual and what is merely possible) playing key roles
in the debate. (See, e.g. Witt 2011; Normore 2012) And in modernity too the link
was widely discussed, with both Locke and Mill, to give just two examples, taking
positions on the matter. (Locke 1975, Bk. 3, Chap. 3; Mill 1843, Bk. 1, Chap. vi).
This, however, ceased to be so in the mid-twentieth century, when the concept of
essence was jettisoned, at least in the Anglo-American philosophical circles
influenced by the logical empiricists, as a piece of metaphysical nonsense. Talk of
essence soon reestablished itself, however, with the development of quantified
modal logic and the revival of interest in de re modality following the work of
Marcus (collected in Marcus 1995) and Kripke (1972, 1980). But the account of
essence which was the standard from the 1950s to 1994 was a modal account,
according to which one can specify the essential properties an individual has in
terms of its possession of de re necessary properties. However, since then, largely
due to the seminal work of Kit Fine (1994, 1995a, 1995b, 2000) and that of Jonathan
Lowe (1997, 2007, 2008, 2011, 2012a, 2012b), there has been a resurgence of
interest in giving a broadly Aristotelian account of essence according to which we
can specify the essential properties an individual has independently of its de re
necessary properties, but in a way that nonetheless explains why its essential
properties are also de re necessary ones.1 Here is how Mark Jago, a recent advocate
of the view, has summed it up:
Here is a rough outline of the idea. If something is necessarily such that A,
then something or some things are essentially such that A. That necessity
obtains because those things are essentially such that A… [E]ssence is the
source or basis of necessity. The simplest case is when an object is necessarily
F because it itself is essentially F. It is necessary that I am human because
being human is part of my essence. (Jago 2018: 6)
The neo-Aristotelian account appeals to the idea that an essential property is part of
an object’s ‘real definition’ or part of ‘what an object is’, understood in some
metaphysically significant Aristotelian sense (see, e.g., Fine (1994), Lowe (2008),
Gorman (2005)). As we will put it, neo-Aristotelian essentialists hold that a property
F is an essential property of x if specifying F gives a correct answer to the
Aristotelian ‘what is x?’ question.
Now, it should be clear from the above that a crucial claim accepted by neo-
Aristotelian essentialists is the following one:
1 Of course, Quine rejected what he called ‘Aristotelian essentialism’ in his battle against quantified
modal logic (e.g., in his 1953 and 1961) and unfortunately for him lived long enough to see it thrive in the
aftermath of the Kripkean revolution. But what he and Kripke (1972) debated was a notion of essence
defined in terms of de re necessity, i.e. the notion given by the modal account of essence.
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Essence-Necessity Link (E-N): If x is essentially F, then x is necessarily F if it
exists.
And it should also be clear that if neo-Aristotelian essentialists are to achieve
their aim of explaining de re necessity in terms of essence, they must provide us
with at least some reason for believing E-N to be true.
In the recent literature on essence the question whether this can be done has been
pressed by a number of authors (Casullo 2020; Leech 2018; Mackie 2020; Noonan
2018; Romero 2019).
Jago defends E-N. In fact, he defends it as a conceptual truth. He also gives an
account of how ordinary knowers can come to know an individual’s essential
properties. And, on the basis of the thesis that E-N is a conceptual truth, he argues
that knowers can move from knowledge of individuals’ essential properties to
knowledge of their metaphysically necessary and non-actual but possible properties.
That is, Jago proposes an essentialist account of a route to knowledge of the way
things must be and could have been.
We argue that Jago’s essentialist account of our knowledge of de re metaphysical
modality fails. He does not succeed in explaining how knowledge of de re
metaphysical ncecessity can be acquired on the basis of knowledge of the essential
properties of individuals. Nor does he succeed in explaining how knowledge of non-
actual de re possibility can be acquired on this basis. Finally, he does not succeed in
explaining how ordinary knowers can come to have knowledge of an individual’s
essential properties. This is important because the thought that our knowledge of
metaphysical modality has its source in our knowledge of essence is currently an
attractive one and Jago has set out very clearly what has to be done to justify the
thought. The flaws in his proposal thus indicate the work needed if the attractive
thought is to be accepted.
We give the arguments for the contentions just made after first outlining the
structure of Jago’s paper and then filling out the details of the essentialist position he
adopts (inspired by Fine).
2 Jago’s Paper
Jago’s paper has four parts. First, he explains two accounts of modal epistemology
he rejects: the conceivability account inspired by Hume and the counterfactual
knowledge account put forward by Williamson (2007). He criticizes these as a way
of providing motivation for the Finean account he defends. Next he gives an account
of the Finean theory that facts about metaphysical modality are grounded in facts
about essence, clarifying the modifications he wishes to make. He defends the
theory from a criticism by Wildman (2018), but his main argument for it is an
argument for the conceptual truth of E-N, considered below. The rest of the paper is
devoted to the exposition and defence of the essentialist theory of our epistemic
access to modality outlined in our Introduction. The argument that we can have
knowledge of an individual’s essence draws on considerations about how reference,
in particular reference to coincident material objects, is possible. And the argument
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that knowledge of metaphysical modality can be arrived at via knowledge of
essence is then based on the contention that E-N is a conceptual truth.
3 Essentialism
The essentialist theory of modality Jago endorses derives from Fine. In his seminal
paper (1994) Fine gives conclusive counter-examples to the straightforward
identification of essential properties with necessary ones. His most famous example
is the following, in his own words:
Consider, then, Socrates and the set whose sole member is Socrates. It is then
necessary, according to standard views within modal set theory, that Socrates
belongs to singleton Socrates if he exists; for, necessarily, the singleton exists
if Socrates exists and, necessarily, Socrates belongs to singleton Socrates if
both Socrates and the singleton exist. It therefore follows according to the
modal criterion that Socrates essentially belongs to singleton Socrates.... But,
intuitively, this is not so. It is no part of the essence of Socrates to belong to
the singleton. (1994: 4–5)
Similarly, Fine argues, necessarily if Socrates exists then 2 ? 2 = 4. There is no
world in which Socrates exists and 2 ? 2 does not equal 4 because it is true in all
worlds that 2 ? 2 = 4. However, it does not seem to be part of the essence of
Socrates that 2 ? 2 = 4.
One response to Fine’s examples has been to attempt to define essential
properties as a sub-species of necessary properties (see Leech (2018): section 3 for a
survey). But this is not Fine’s response. Rather he says:
[F]ar from viewing essence as a special case of metaphysical necessity, we
should view metaphysical necessity as a special case of essence. For each class
of objects, be they concepts or individuals or entities of some other kind, will
give rise to its own domain of metaphysically necessary truths, the truths
which flow from the nature of the objects in question. The metaphysically
necessary truths can then be identified with the propositions which are true in
virtue of the nature of all objects whatever. (Fine 1994: 9)
In the simplest case, as noted by Jago in the first quotation above, an object is
necessarily F because it is essentially F, it is part of its essence that it is F. That is
why Socrates is necessarily human. But the metaphysical necessity that if Socrates
exists then 2 ? 2 = 4 does not obtain in virtue of the essence of Socrates. It is
metaphysically necessary that if Socrates exists 2 ? 2 = 4 in virtue of the essences
of 2 and 4 and perhaps addition. Again, Socrates is necessarily a member of
singleton Socrates not because it is part of his essence alone to be so, but in virtue of
the essence of the singleton.
Thus it is not the case that whenever something is necessarily F it is essentially F,
but in the simplest case it is. And the truth of E-N is part of the Finean position: if is
part of the essence of x that it is F then x is necessarily F since the truth that x is F
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‘flows from’ the nature of x. Jago’s claim, as we have noted, is that this is not only
true but conceptually true.
4 Knowledge of de re Necessities
We now turn to our critique of Jago’s position. We begin with a criticism from
Curtis (2019) of Jago’s claim that E-N is a conceptual truth and thus implicitly
available to ordinary knowers. Rather, Jago says, it is merely a theoretical
component of Fine’s theory of essence, which ordinary knowers are not acquainted
with.
Jago recognizes the importance of the contention that E-N is a conceptual truth
for his position. He writes, ‘it is part of [the standard] concepts of essence and
necessity that whoever possesses these concepts and knows that x is essentially F
thereby knows, or is in a position to come to know by reflection, that it is necessary
that ‘x is F’ (Jago 2018: 214).
But Curtis asks, how can a link between an individual’s essential properties and
his de re necessary properties be a conceptual one? If essence is defined in terms of
metaphysical necessity (so that being essentially F is being necessarily F and …)
this could be so, but this is in direct opposition to Fine’s theory of essence. We
could also understand the link between essence and de re necessity as a conceptual
one, we will add, if we thought of being essentially F as a way of being necessarily F
(as being red is a special way of being coloured though being red cannot be defined
as being coloured and …). But again this is what a Finean cannot say (Fine says,
recall, that according to the neo-Aristotelian essentialist point of view, ‘far from
viewing essence as a special case of metaphysical necessity, we should view
metaphysical necessity as a special case of essence’ (1994: 9)).
But otherwise how can the link between essence and de re necessity be
understood as conceptual? Curtis writes, ‘Put in terms of possible worlds E-N tells
us, for example, that if being human is part of an individual’s essence in the actual
world, then that very being possesses being human in every world in which it exists.
Quite how this can be a conceptual truth is utterly perplexing’ (Curtis 2019: 3).
Curtis acknowledges a conceptual link between the notion of essence and one
notion of necessity, the notion of de dicto necessity. It is, for example, plausible that
if electrons are essentially negatively charged (i.e., if that is part of just what it is to
be an electron) then it is a conceptual truth that ‘necessarily, for all x, if x is an
electron, then x is negatively charged’. Similarly, if bachelors are essentially men
(males) (i.e., if it is part of what it is to be a bachelor to be a man) then it is a
conceptual truth that necessarily, for all x, if x is a bachelor, then x is a man. But
these are merely de dicto necessities. What Jago needs an argument for is, for
example, the proposition that it is a conceptual truth that if x is essentially an
electron then x is necessarily negatively charged. But such a conceptual link
between essence and de necessity is simply not supported by these considerations in
support of such a link between essence and de dicto necessity.
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However, it is precisely these considerations that Jago appeals to in support of the
conceptual link between essence and necessity, as Curtis notes. For example, Jago
writes:
[T]he concept of necessity is linked to the concept of essence. There is
evidence for the link in everyday usage…. For example, having been asked
why ... bachelors are always men, one may reply: ... Bachelors have to be men.
That’s part of the nature of being a bachelor…. That the explanations are
natural suggests the link from essence to necessity is embedded in everyday
conceptual schemes. (2018: 15)
The link between essence and de dicto necessity may indeed be so embedded, but
what Jago needs to be embedded is a link between essence (nature, what it is to be)
and de re necessity. Without that his essentialist account of our knowledge of de re
necessities (e.g., that I could not have been a turnip) fails.
5 Knowledge of de re Possibility
If it fails, however, so also we now argue does his account of our knowledge of de re
possibility. We could have now been in Germany (we are not). We could have been
accountants (we are not). How can we know these things? Jago argues that we can
know them via knowledge of what is inessential to us (2018: 12), and we can know
this because we can know the kind (sort) of thing we are (human beings). Speaking
of knowledge of your de re possibilities he writes (2018: 15):
I know that I could have been where you are right now and you here. My
belief is based on my understanding of the kinds of things that you and I (and
here and there) are. You and I are both human beings, for whom each specific
location is inessential. My front room is a very ordinary room in an ordinary
location. In particular, nothing about what makes it the place it is excludes
your being here. I know all that. So I know that nothing in the essences of
those entities excludes your being here. I may then infer that you could have
been here. If I do, the inference will preserve knowledge and so I will come to
know that you could have been here.
Mutatis mutandis, we know that we could have been accountants. How? Well, we
know that we are human beinsg, for whom each specific life path is inessential. So
we know that nothing in our essences excludes being accountants. We infer thatwe
could have been accountants.
Recall now that according to Jago we move from knowledge about essence to
knowledge about metaphysical modality. So the idea is that we can move from
knowledge that any life path we in fact follow is inessential to the de re possibility
of another one: for example, from the inessentiality of being here to the possibility
of being elsewhere, or from the inessentiality of being philosophy teachers to the
possibility of not being philosophy teachers, but, for example, accountants. But,
importantly, it appears that there is a more direct explanation available of our
knowledge that we could have been accountants. It is a conceptual truth, one can
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say, that if something is a human being it could have had a different life path from
the one it has (‘necessarily, for any x, if x is a human being and x is a philosopher
then possibly, x is not a philosopher’ is conceptually true). Thus, from knowing that
someone is a human being one can infer that he could have followed some other life
path (for example, become an accountant). For us to know this and to make the
inference it suffices that we have the concepts of a human being, a philosopher and
de re modality. If we are allowed to appeal in the explanation of our knowledge of
de re possibility to conceptual truths linking concepts of sortal kinds, like human
being, to the concept of essence, then we can more directly appeal to such truths
linking these concepts to the concept of de re possibility/necessity.2 Jago’s appeal to
essence thus appears to be redundant here. Indeed, it seems obvious that the
inference he is making goes the other way. When we accept his claim that it is an
inessential property of you that you are where you in fact are (and could have been
here) why do we accept this? Because we think that you need not have been where
you are (unlike, for example, a lake).3
6 Knowledge of Essences
So far we have objected to Jago’s attempt to show how ordinary knowers can move
from knowledge of essence to knowledge of metaphysical modality. We now turn to
his account of how ordinary knowers can come to knowledge of an individual’s
essential properties itself.
Jago’s starting point is reference to material objects, and specifically, reference to
sometime coincident material objects, like the statue and the clay, or the painting
and the coincident collection of molecules (Jago 2018: 9). How can we refer to the
statue which is coincident with the piece of clay? What secures reference in this
case, he says, entirely convincingly, is specification of a location plus a specification
which distinguishes the coincident objects in that location. We single out the statue
as the statue in the location. So our belief that the object we are speaking of is a
statue (if it exists) is safe (Jago 2018: 12). If we are successful in referring to
anything it cannot fail to be a statue. But Jago argues, when we conceptualise
something as of sort F we typically think of it as being essentially F. So we not only
think that the thing we are picking out (the statue) is a statue. We also believe that it
is essentially a statue. And just as our belief that it is a statue (if it exists) is safe (we
2 Of course, either appeal can be disputed, e.g., by Quinean sceptics about modality and essence and
those who follow Lewis in thinking that modal predication is inconstant. Their position will be that the
only objective knowledge of modality we have, is at most, knowledge of de dicto modality. We know for
example, that it is possible that something is a human being and not a philosopher. So how do we know
that Lewis need not have been a philosopher, but could have been, for example, an accountant? The
Lewisean story is this. To know this is to know Lewis has a contextually salient counterpart in some
(other) possible world who is not a philosopher but an accountant, someone who resembles him in
contextually salient ways. But we do, in fact, know this, because we know that that there are many
(similarly educated, intelligent etc.) actual men who are accountants. This is the easy case for a Lewisean;
knowledge that he could have been an accountant who is also a lion tamer, or a cross-dressing lumberjack
(assuming there are actually none) is harder.
3 Jago (2018: 13) mentions Hirsch’s (1976) ‘incars’ as an example of things whose particular location is
essential to them; lakes seem a more familiar example.
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would not be referring to it unless it was) so our belief that it is essentially a statue is
safe (given what the essentialist thinks, that statues are essentially statues). So as a
safe true belief it constitutes knowledge of an individual’s essence.
This argument delivers less than appears. Let it be granted that we have a notion
of what sort of thing a thing is such that knowing that something is a statue amounts
to knowing what sort of thing it is (statue is a sortal concept). So if we believe that
something is a statue we will believe, because we have this concept of a sort, both
that it is a statue and that being a statue is the sort of thing it is. Then in the
circumstances envisaged by Jago (of successful reference to one of two coincident
entities) just as we know that it is a statue if it exists we know that being a statue is
the sort of thing it is if it exists. Instead of describing what we know in this way we
can speak instead of nature or essence (the neo-Aristotelian concept of essence is, of
course, tightly linked to the notion of a sortal concept)4 and so we can say that we
know that the thing is a statue if it exists and its essence is to be a statue, or that we
know that it is essentially a statue if it exists. But now the crucial question for Jago
again becomes what the link is between this notion of essence, understood via the
notion of a sort, and the notion of de re necessity. How is it to be established as a
conceptual truth that if x is of sort F it is of de re necessity of sort F? Jago’s idea is
that in the circumstances he envisages appeal to a (substance) sortal property (being
a statue) is necessary for identifying reference and thought about the thing
possessing it. But even if this is so, and even if (to be still more concessive) in every
situation in which it exists an object can only be identified and spoken about by
appeal to the (substance) sortal property it possesses in that situation, it remains
mysterious that the substance sortal property a thing in fact possesses (i.e., possesses
in the actual world) must be one it necessarily possesses (i.e., possesses in any world
in which it exists). Given that Kal-El is a human-like Kryptonian could he not have
been (laws of copyright aside) a super-powered android or a hammer-wielding
Norse god? Could Lewis’s plastic dishpan (1986: 252) not have been a plastic toy
duck (as it might have been if there had not been a last-minute change of production
line in the factory)? If these things had been thus different they would still have
been identifiable under sortal concepts, just different sortal concepts. If Jago’s
concept of essence is such that we can infer from the fact that something is a statue
and statue is a sortal kind that it is essentially a statue all the interest of the paper
shifts to the question whether there is a conceptual link between sortalhood and de
re necessity. But if the concept of essence is understood to incorporate the link to de
re necessity, his inference that if we know, for example, that something is a statue
we can know that it is essentially a statue becomes problematic. What remains, like
the frog peering up at us from the bottom of the beer mug, is still the question of the
conceptual truth of E-N.
4 Fine himself agrees with this and that the link is crucial to explaining knowledge of modality via
knowledge of essence. In his (2005), after summarising his view that we must give a non-modal account
of which properties are essential properties and explain modal properties in terms of them, he says (taking
‘man’ as his example): ‘The only plausible non-modal definition of ‘‘man’’ is one that classifies the object
under a sort; to be a man is to be an F (where this is the sort) differentiated in such and such a way. If we
use only ordinary non-sortal properties in stating what a man is, then it is hard to see how the definition




That is the argument. We conclude that Jago has not provided an adequate account
of how ordinary knowers can come to knowledge of metaphysical modality on the
basis of knowledge of essence.
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